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Do concepts like "local" versus "statewide" problems have salience
today? Can city borders demarcate a meaningful realm of public policy
that permits cities to confront the challenges of urban complexity and
metropolitan fragmentation? Can we address problems of regional ineq-
uity and inefficiency using city-led solutions? In her article on the little-
noticed but powerful extraterritorial impact limit on home rule powers,'
Professor Reynolds has triggered these and other important theoretical
questions and drawn our attention to local borders in a new way.
As she describes, the judicially crafted doctrine of an extraterritorial
impact limit blocks local legislation that technically applies only within
the borders of a home rule city, 2 but in fact imposes an extraterritorial
impact on areas or people outside city lines. The doctrine is derived
from the "axiomatic ' 3 principle that home rule cities do not have the
power to act beyond their borders in the absence of express statutory
authorization to the contrary.4
As currently applied, the extraterritorial impact limit constrains ci-
ties' ability to enact laws that have indirect spillover consequences on
people or places outside their borders or are targeted to address problems
that originate outside those borders. This interpretation, Professor Rey-
nolds argues, squelches local efforts to address regional problems. For
instance, the limit has been invoked to strike down an inclusionary zon-
ing ordinance passed by a major regional employment center as well as a
i Assistant Professor of Law, UC Berkeley Law School. I am grateful for the insightful
comments of Nestor Davidson and Laurie Reynolds and the editors of the Denver University law
Review.
1. See Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region, 86 DENY. U. L.
REv. 1271 (2009).
2. Though this discussion refers primarily to home rule cities, its core arguments and doc-
trinal foundations apply equally to home rule counties.
3. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at n.19 (quoting Seigles v. City of St. Charles, 849 N.E.2d
456 (Ml. App. CL 2006)).
4. Most notably, such authorization includes, in some states, regulatory powers (like zoning
authority), condemnation powers, or both. See Richard Briffault, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel
Valley Corp: Extraterritoriality and LocalAutonomy, 86 DENV. U. L REv. 1311 (2009).
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traffic control measure passed by a city within a regional commuter cor-
ridor.5
Professor Reynolds makes a strong case that, in addition to con-
straining regionalism, courts' interpretations of the extraterritorial impact
limit have been undisciplined and unduly expansive. She forcefully ar-
gues that some strands of interpretation have undermined the very expe-
rimentation and local legal diversity that home rule authority was de-
signed to foster. For instance, the extraterritorial impact limit has immo-
bilized home rule cities between contradictory rules; it blocks some leg-
islation that may cause a cumulative impact (because adjacent units may
adopt similar laws), while also blocking legislation that may create a
confusing and inefficient "patchwork" of laws (because adjacent units
may adopt different laws).6 Further, the doctrine has subjected home rule
cities to amorphous, unpredictable standards like the prohibition on
extraterritorial "ripple effects," which can include any effect on the costs
or conduct of persons or businesses outside the home rule city.
Despite these problems, the extraterritorial impact limit is rooted in
some important rationales that warrant our continued observance. With
my brief comments here, I will make the case for a few of these ratio-
nales, then provide a more modest alternative proposal for fixing, rather
than eliminating, the doctrine. Before embarking on either goal, howev-
er, I'll follow Professor Reynolds's lead to cast one more stone at the
extraterritorial impact limit, as it is currently interpreted.
I. ONE MORE RISK OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPACT LIMIT
Picture the following two scenarios. In one, a home rule county es-
tablishes new rules governing the performance of service contracts with-
in the county, such as the right to cancel the contract without penalty
within three days after signing.7 In the other, a home rule county brings
an affirmative lawsuit challenging extortionate fees by so-called "payday
lenders."8 Both scenarios fall within the general rubric of consumer pro-
tection. Both are intended to protect persons within the jurisdiction. But
both will also exert inevitable spillover protections (or impositions) on
persons outside.9 Under the extraterritorial impact limit as currently un-
5. See Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 38 (Colo. 2000);
City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1281-82 (Colo. 2003); Reynolds, supra note 1, at
1294-98.
6. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1279.
7. See Holiday Universal, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 833 A.2d 518, 520-21 (Md. 2003);
see also Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1280-81 (discussing Holiday Universal).
8. See First Amended Complaint at 1, 24, California v. Check 'n Go of Cal. Inc., No. 462-
779 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. County, Jan. 5, 2009); see also Kathleen Morris, San Francisco and the
Rising Culture of Engagement in Local Public Law Offices (forthcoming 2009 in Why the Local Still
Matters monograph of papers from the 11 th Annual Liman Colloquium at Yale Law School 2008).
9. In the first case, such spillover effects are arguably twofold: the law would reach persons
entering into such contracts outside the jurisdiction but intending to perform the specified service
inside the jurisdiction, and the law would reach persons entering contracts within the jurisdiction, but
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derstood, the first approach of addressing the problem through legislation
exceeds the county's powers. Yet the second approach, to address the
problem through affirmative litigation, is subject to no such constraints.
Does such a differentiation make sense? It advantages litigation as
a means of solving urban problems, where legislation might achieve a
more efficient and tailored result. If cities are limited to the second sce-
nario, they may only take action against a problem affecting their consti-
tuents where state or federal law already prohibits the conduct. They
cannot enact new laws to address a problem that affects only a small
portion of the public and thus has not warranted the attention of state or
federal lawmakers or is otherwise not reachable by existing laws. The
current regime curtails home rule cities' ability to address problems
proactively-including problems that are present only in certain com-
munities, for instance, or shared within one region but not common
across a state-that fall between the cracks of local and statewide con-
cern.
U. HAVING SAID THAT, A FEw GOOD THINGS ABOUT AN
EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPACT LIMIT
As problematic as the application of the extraterritorial impact limit
may have become, we should pause before discarding it entirely. Under-
lying the principle are some important attributes worth preserving.
First of all, a law that truly causes an extraterritorial impact is not
democratically accountable to some or all persons affected by that law.
While it is important to distinguish acts causing an extraterritorial impact
from acts of coercive extraterritorial authority like extraterritorial regula-
tion and eminent domain, these are matters of degree more than differ-
ence. In either scenario, law should check a city's power to affect out-
siders who have no participation or protest rights in that city's politics.
My own research on high-poverty neighborhoods just outside of city
lines illustrates this argument-local borders may not encompass all
neighborhoods most affected by local lawmaking, and outsiders' lack of
local voting rights compounds and perpetuates these spillover effects. 10
Because extraterritoriality tracks the boundaries of representative gov-
ernment, it is an obvious, logical metric for courts to demarcate local
intending to perform the specified service outside the jurisdiction. In the second case, the spillover
effects arise because once the defendant has been deemed in violation of specific consumer protec-
tion laws it will be prohibited from undertaking those activities anywhere under the jurisdiction of
those same laws.
10. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty and Exclusion at the
Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2009); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local
Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming April 2010).
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authority and to determine the balance of power between cities and the
state. 1
Second, the concept of what is "local" versus what is "extraterritori-
al" is not merely a sword against local legislation. It can also be a shield
from state intervention in so-called imperio states (which carve out ex-
clusive realms of "local" versus "statewide" control), where home rule
jurisdictions enjoy a field of complete autonomy over "municipal" or
"local" affairs.12 That means they are immune from state meddling and
intervention in these domains, even where a state explicitly tries to
preempt local legislation.
Professor Reynolds seems to accept the loss of this shield were we
to eliminate the extraterritorial impact limit, arguing that we should in
fact transfer the decisional baton from judges to state legislatures, be-
cause extraterritoriality (and any demarcation of exclusive domains of
local versus state regulation) has proven elusive and outmoded. This
change would not be wholly unreasonable on its face, but it would be
quite dramatic, even radical. It would undermine local autonomy by
granting state legislatures the final word in defining their authority com-
pared to that of local governments, something that imperio states ex-
pressly chose not to do in designing their home rule systems. As a result,
it would elide the differences between imperio and legislative versions of
home rule power and strengthen state authority over local governments.
It is also clear that courts are struggling in these cases to maintain
the free flow of people, goods, and services across municipalities, which
requires some level of legal harmonization and coordination. Such a
motive helps to explain extraterritorial impact cases striking down local
rules governing service contracts or regulating utility companies. 13 In
this sense, extraterritorial impact constraints are challenging and contro-
versial for judges in ways similar to federal commerce clause questions.
Few would argue that in light of these interpretive challenges, we should
let Congress resolve conflicts with states over the breadth of Congress's
interstate commerce authority. We should be cautious of reaching an
analogous conclusion here. When it comes to balancing power between
two governments, the courts are better suited to the task than the larger
governmental unit, if we care, as Professor Reynolds and I both do, about
the autonomy of the smaller unit.
11. The Supreme Court has reasoned similarly. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,
439 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1978) (finding that cities always exert spillover effects, so borders are the only
finite line by which to corral and demarcate participatory rights).
12. For a more complete description of the imperio versus legislative home rule systems see
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1275-77.
13. See Holiday Universal, 833 A.2d at 520-21; People ex rel. Pub. Utilities Comm'n v. Mt.
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 243 P.2d 397, 401 (Colo. 1952); see also Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1280-81
& n.38 (discussing these cases).
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Lastly, I agree with Professor Reynolds that local governments are
capable of alleviating regional harms through innovative leadership. Yet
we should not lose sight of the fact, as Professor Reynolds has argued in
other contexts, that many forms of regional inequity are the result of lo-
cal parochialism and self-interest at the expense of other jurisdictions.
14
Whether they mandate the exclusion of affordable housing, landfills, or
residence by convicted sex offenders, exclusionary zoning laws lead to
the siting of such land uses in ways that have concentrated poverty and
polarized the material conditions within metropolitan areas. 15 Local leg-
islatures may, or may not, have regional interests at heart when setting
policy. The extraterritorial impact limit represents freedom from region-
al impacts of self-interested local lawmaking as well as a constraint on
regionally benevolent lawmaking. Consequently, we need consistently
applied rules that define local and state power without presuming who
will be the more regionalist lawmaker.
III. COMING INTO BALANCE-FIXING, WITHOUT DISCARDING, THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPACT LIMIT
An extraterritorial impact limit on home rule authority thus has im-
portant rationales that should caution care before discarding the doctrine
entirely,' 6 even given Professor Reynolds's strong arguments that the
extraterritorial impact limit has led to unpredictable and speculative re-
sults, concentrated excessive power with the courts, and undermined
regionalism. To reconcile these concerns, I would favor the more mod-
erate goal of disciplining rather than abandoning this doctrine, with the
goal of continuing to control extraterritorial impacts in a society where
borders are less likely to contain regulatory influence.
To achieve this, I would advocate that instead of placing the focus
on "extraterritoriality," we focus on giving meaning to the concept of
"impact." Currently, as Professor Reynolds discusses, the only threshold
for cognizable "impact" under the doctrine is that it must be greater than
"de minimis" or "incidental." 17 This is an unnecessarily weak and vague
standard. Federal statutory laws governing fair housing and environmen-
tal protection, by contrast, require that a cognizable "impact" or "effect"
14. See Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New
Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93 (2003).
15. For a discussion of exclusionary zoning and its consequences see, for example, David
Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy and the Legal Chal-
lenges of Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 427, 434-54 (2000); Jerry
Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1083-89 (1996); JONATHAN LEVINE,
ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN
LAND-USE (2006).
16. This reform would simply mean taking the concept of "territory" within "extraterritorial"
seriously, focusing on the location of the regulated activity with no concern for "impact" outside city
borders. It would continue to prohibit a home rule unit from applying its police powers to activity
occurring beyond its borders.
17. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1278 (quoting City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 161
(Colo. 2003), and City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 769 (Colo. 1990)).
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must mean something significant (provably so), with a causal link to the
state action. They provide models for setting a higher minimum standard
for the extraterritorial impact reachable by an extraterritorial impact lim-
it.
For instance, a plaintiff alleging a racially disparate impact in viola-
tion of the Fair Housing Act 8 must show that a challenged practice by
the defendant "'actually or predictably results in racial discrimina-
tion."" 9 Further, that effect must be "significant," 20 and "an inference"
of such an impact is not sufficient-a plaintiff "must show a causal con-
nection between the facially neutral policy and the alleged discriminatory
effect.",21 Case law applying these standards is strict, ordinarily requiring
plaintiffs to document statistically the effects caused by the legislation.22
The National Environmental Policy Act provides a second model.
That statute requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact
statement for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment., 23  The statute distinguishes "direct effects"
from "indirect effects," 24 with direct effects defined as "caused by the
action and occur[ing] at the same time and place," while "indirect" ef-
fects are "caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in
distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable. 25 Land use changes that
are "induced" by the federal action, for instance, are classified as indirect
effects.26  Both classifications require causation. Effects that warrant
consideration in an environmental impact statement must be "proba-
ble"-not "remote" or "highly speculative. 27
Applying that rubric to the present setting, courts could impose
much greater discipline on the extraterritorial impact limit by, for in-
stance, invalidating local laws only where they "directly" cause a "signif-
icant" outcome outside city borders. A plaintiff challenging an inclusio-
nary zoning ordinance would thus have the burden to prove both the fact
and extent of impacts predicted outside city lines.
18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a) (West 2009).
19. N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988) affd per curiam,
488 U.S. 15 (1988) (quoting United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir.
1974)).
20. Reinhart v. Lincoln County, 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see
also Huntington, 844 F.2d at 938 (finding "a substantial adverse impact on minorities").
21. Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dept., 352 F.3d 565,575 (2d Cir. 2003).
22. Id. at 575. For instance, the Second Circuit rejected a Fair Housing Act claim that new
housing regulations would create a disparate impact by increasing land prices in a community where
members of the protected class were priced out of purchasing homes above a certain cost. Instead,
the court found that the required proof would have shown the specific cost of dwellings before and
after the regulation took effect and the percentages of protected and nonprotected persons who
would be priced out of the post-regulation market. See Reinhart, 482 F.3d at 1230-31.
23. 42 U.S.C.A § 4332(C) (West 2009); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9(a), 1508.13.
24. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(a)-(b).
25. Id. § 1508.8(a)-(b).
26. Id. § 1508.8(b).
27. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974).
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In combination with shifting our focus from extraterritoriality to
impact, the private law exception to home rule authority-which is pre-
mised in part on the inherent extraterritorial impacts of certain kinds of
lawmaking-can assist courts in implementing their concern for legal
predictability.28 This rule constrains local governments from altering
common law property, tort or contract rules; imposing substantial extra-
territorial effects; or causing "undue burdens and extreme inefficiency"
on parties in multiple localities.29 Without excessive reliance on extrater-
ritorial impact, courts can nonetheless pursue interlocal uniformity.
Such an approach would continue to vest judges with interpretive
authority, but it would better protect a realm of genuine autonomy for
home rule governments that is not subject to state preemption, while also
limiting those governments to democratically accountable decisions.
CONCLUSION
Whatever our solution might be, Professor Reynolds has drawn our
attention to a doctrinal mechanism that currently confines home rule ci-
ties' ability to apply legislative innovation and experimentation to urban
problems. In an era when local governments are increasingly flexing
their wings to address social, economic, and environmental problems, we
should be particularly concerned about such a mechanism. Yet, in my
view, our response should be tempered to preserve the core notion of an
exterritorial impact limit while imposing greater discipline on its applica-
tion. Like home rule authority in general, the limit can function as both
sword and shield-it can suppress desirable local legislation, but so too
can it protect cities from neighbors' undesirable spillover effects and a
state legislature's divergent interests. To remove such a limit entirely
would not eliminate the eroding categories of "local" versus "statewide"
interests; rather, it would permit legislatures rather than judges to estab-
lish the boundaries of those categories. Such a change would fundamen-
tally undermine the autonomy of home rule cities while granting little
assurance of the kind of interlocal responsibility that both Professor Rey-
nolds and I prize.
28. Indeed, both of the consumer protection scenarios described in Part II are captured by the
underlying logic of leaving private law matters, including contract law, outside the scope of home
rule powers. See Gary Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 UCLA
L. REv. 671 (1973).
29. See id. at 728-39, 750.
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